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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS R, COBURN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

GIVAN FORD SALES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,

Case No.
13353

and
CRAIG D. KEMPTON,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATITEE OF THE CASE
Givan Ford, Inc., appeals from a jury verdict finding
it liable as principal for the tortious conduct of Craig
Kempton.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUET
Following the return of jury verdict, the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen of the District Court in and for Utah
County entered a judgment in the amount of $22,000
against defendant Givan Ford, Inc. The motions made
by Givan Ford, Inc., for dismissal, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial were denied.
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant requests that the verdict and judgment
against it be set aside and a judgment of no cause of
action be entered as a matter of law. Alternatively, it
requests that the case be remitted to the District Court
of Utah County for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 4, 1970, at the intersection of Fifth
South and University Avenue in Provo, Utah, a Sunbeam sports car driven by Craig Kempton was involved
in a collision with an automobile driven by Dennis Coburn. (B. 5, 126). The Sunbeam was owned by
the appellant, Givan Ford, Inc., who employed Mr.
Kempton as a lot boy. (E. 130, 215). As an employee
of Grivan Ford, Mr. Kempton had various duties including: starting the cars regularly, keeping them clean,
changing antifreeze, checking batteries, and running
errands on the directions of his supervisors. (E. 45, 49,
215, 216, 228). He had no training or experience as a
mechanic and had no responsibility for repairing automobiles. (E. 50).
It was uncontradicted that Mr. Kempton was not
qualified nor authorized to test drive the cars (E. 13031), that he did not work under the direction of the
salesmen (E. 131), and that any familiarity with the
cars came through taking them on errands and starting
them each morning (E. 46, 47,107).
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Mr. Kempton had an agreement with some of the
salesmen that if he brought customers to them, he would
receive-a finder's fee out of the salesmen's commissions.
It was uneontraoted that this was an entirely private
agreement between Mr. Kempton and the salesmen,
that Givan Ford, Inc., was in now way involved, and
that Kempton himself had no duties as a salesman.
(R. 106,107,134,135, 230, 233).
At the time of the accident Mr. Kempton was not
engaged in performing any of his duties, and had not
been given instructions or permission to take the car,
but was driving the Sunbeam to satisfy his curiosity
about the car and because he was interested in purchasing it for conversion into a dune buggy. (R. 132,
133, 135, 215, 217).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF LIABILITY ON THE PART
OF GIVAN FORD WAS INCOMPETENT AND IMPROPERLY ADMITTED.

Plaintiff's case against appellant was based solely
on respondeat superior and he had the burden to prove
that at the time of the accident, Mr. Kempton was acting
within the scope of his employment* Sottas v. [Affleck,
99 Utah 65,102 P.2d 493 (1940).
For an employee to be acting within the scope of his
employment, he must be doing acts which further the
employer's business and which are reasonably incidental
to his employment.
f-
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In Carter v. Bessey, 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 493
(1939), the Court stated:
" T h e question in every case is whether the
act he was doing was one in prosecution of his
master's business and not whether it was done in
accordance with the master's instructions."
Lewis v. Mammoth Mining
Pac. 732, 733 (1908), states:

Co., 33 Utah 273, 93

" T h e important question is not whether they
acted in accordance with the instructions given
them by the defendant, but were they at the time
of the commission of the alleged negligent acts
performing a service for the defendant in furtherance of its business."
In its opinion in Burton v. LaDuke, 61 Utah 78,
210 Pac. 978, 981 (1922), the Court said:
"These cases support the doctrine that before
the master may be rightfully charged with the
negligence of his servant, ordinarily it must be
shown that the servant was engaged in prosecuting the master's business."
In the present case, the evidence clearly established
that at the time of the accident Mr. Kempton was doing
nothing in furtherance of his employer's business or
which was reasonably incidental to his employment.
All direct testimony was contrary to plaintiff's position. The evidence established that Mr. Kempton was
only authorized to take cars from the lot in one of the
following following circumstances: (1) the antifreeze
in a car needed to be changed, in which case he was
authorized only to drive the car across the street, (2)

4
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to drive to the corner gasoline station for tire repair,
or (3) upon express instruction, to take a car on an
errand. Mr. Kempton admitted that he was to take
instructions only from Ernest Earl, E d or L a r r y Givan
or Dennis Davis. (E. 131). Both Mr. E a r l and Mr.
Kempton testified in detail concerning the work order
system for picking up or delivering parts and it was
without contradiction that no such errand was being
performed when this accident occurred. Mr. Kempton
testified that he did not take the car as part of his employment, but drove the Sunbeam as a prospective purchaser, interested in using the chassis and running gear
to construct a dune buggy. (R. 132, 133, 135, 215, 217).
Unable to adduce any helpful testimony, plaintiff's
counsel read into the record, over objection, portions
of Mr. Kempton's deposition taken July 2,1971:
Q. (By Mr. Jeffs) Now if you will follow
me on page 31, I asked you which salesman asked
you about the condition of the specific cars on
the lot, and you answered: "All of them would.
If I was around there they would say, they would
have a customer and they would yell, 'What kind
of shape is this car in?' I would say, you know,
I would tell them pretty well. Dennie liked to
know just exactly. He didn't like to take the
customer. He would say, 'Does this car run good!
Does it eat oil or do this?' And I would tell h i m . "
(E. 52 and 53).
Later on in the trial, the same question arose again.
T H E COURT: Rule 32(a) (2) says the deposition of a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose.
5
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MR. CLEGG: In this ease, your Honor, it's
our position, and has been, that this witness is
not adverse to the plaintiff on this issue. He's adverse to this defendant.
MR. J E F F S : Your Honor, I don't suppose
it could have been demonstrated more clearly how
adverse he is than what happened yesterday.
THE COURT: You called him under Rule
41, 42, whichever one it is, as regards the plaintiff.
MR, J E F F S : As an adverse witness.
THE COURT: Can you call him for that
purpose as regards the other defendant?
MR. J E F F S : I think so, your Honor.
THE COURT: Let me read two (Rule 32
(a)(2)) again. You will see what is bothering
me. The deposition of a party or of anyone who
at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent or a person
designated under Rule 30(b) (6) or 31(a) to testify
on behalf of a public or private corporation,
partnership, association or governmental agency
which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose.
Now you are not claiming he was a director,
managing agent or officer, are you?
MR. J E F F S : No. I do claim he's adverse
to us, and I do claim that—I may expand on this
question of impeachment. I am trying to use this
for impeachment, yes, that, because of the answers he gave me which were not the same as this
one the other day, and so that there is a twofold
reason: Not only that he's adverse and I want
to be able to use his deposition for any purposes,
but the other one is for impeaching what he was
saying to us.

6
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THE COURT: If this were a two party
lawsuit there would be no question, would there?
MR. J E F F S : That is right. I think the rule
applies whether it's two party or not. I have the
same problem in trying to show what the truth is.
THE COURT: (Let me see the deposition,
young man. Where are we? * * * (R. 11849).
THE COURT: What is the basis of your
objection?
MR, CLEGG: At least two, Tour Honor.
First of all that the deposition is not being used
for impeachment, but to put on affirmative testimony, and the basis for taking the deposition in
a discovery case is much broader than that, so
one should not be able to make a record one place
and superimpose it to the court's stenographer at
this point.
THE COURT: I agree with you on that.
MR. CLEGG: Secondly, it's being elicited
in leading form as against a witness who is not
^adverse to the ^plaintiff on the issue that the
plaintiff on the issue that the plaintiff is now
developing, but is adverse to this defendant,
Givan Ford Company.
MR, J E F F S : If I may respond to that,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: If your objection was on the
grounds it's repetitious I might take a closer
look at it.
MR. CLEGG: I will be glad to raise that
objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: He's already testified to
this, hasn't he?

f
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MR. J E F F S :
this answer. * # #

That is right. He did not give

T H E COURT: Did he tell you what your
responsibilities were?
MR. J E F F S : I have asked him just now,
but we have not had him answer that previously.
:-. (R, 119,120).
3?

TF

TP

T H E COURT: I am going to let him answer
that question. I am going to let you ask him
again about his answers on page 32. I suspect
the objection may be well taken.
T H E COURT:
MR. J E F F S :

Proceed, Mr. Jeffs.
Thank you, Your Honor.

Q. (By Mr. Jeffs) Now, Mr. Kempton, we
were talking about what Ernie E a r l told you your
responsibilities were, and in your deposition you
said: "All he told me was that I was supposed to
keep the cars running pretty good and then he
just gave rne a few things to do. He said, 'We will
keep you busy. You come and ask me what to do,
and I will keep you going for a few days, and from
then on you are on your own.' He said, 'You will
know what to do by then.' " (R, 122).
This use of Mr. Kempton's deposition was improper.
By plaintiff's counsel's own admissions, it was used as
independent evidence to establish the liability of Givan
Ford (R. 120, 121). This is clearly demonstrated from
the record.
T H E COURT: Well, the scope of the employment—what are you offering this for! I
thought this was already in evidence. He's already
testified to the same thing on page 32.

8
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ME. J E F F S : I don't think he's testified to
the fact that Ernie Earl told him to keep the automobiles in good condition and running condition,
and that is what I am offering it for. In other
words, that his direct supervisor instructed him
that was part of his job." (R, 121-122).
Counsel for plaintiff offered the deposition testimony to imply: (1) that Mr. Kempton had duties as a
test driver or mechanic in keeping the cars running;
and (2) that somehow through the private agreements
between Mr. Kempton and various salesmen, he had
acquired the implied authority to disregard the instructions of his supervisor and take cars off the lot on his
own volition.
This evidence would not have been admissible if
directly elicited. The questions were not cast to impeach
but were cast to superimpose discovery evidence (necessarily broad) upon a jury trial. Defendant Givan Ford
contended and contends that this is an abuse of the deposition process and is in derogation of the discovery
rules, and the phrase "by an adverse party for any
purpose" is necessarily limited to parties adverse on the
issue developed.
Rule 32(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"(1) Any deposition may be used by any party
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching
the testimony of deponent as a witness.
" (2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who
at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent . . . of a public

9
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.

. or private corporation, partnership or association
or governmental agency which is a party may be
used by an adverse party for any purpose.

The Court ruled that Mr. Kempton was not an
officer, director or managing agent of defendant Givan
Ford, Inc., but ruled that, since he is a named party to
the lawsuit, his deposition testimony could be used "for
any purpose." Defendant Givan Ford contends that, on
the issue of vicarious liability, Mr. Kempton and the
plaintiff were not adverse to each other but the testimony elicited was offered solely against, and was adverse
only to, defendant Givan Ford.
Kule 32(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is
identical to the Utah rule. Concerning this Rule, a noted
authority states:

•

"Tine deposition of a party may be used for
any purpose only by an adverse party; and the
deposition of a party may not be used by anyone
other than an adverse party for any purpose except impeachment of the testimony of the deponent as a witness as provided in Rule 32(a)(1),
unless the Court finds the existence of one of the
conditions enumerated in Rule 32(a) (3).£Adverse
party7 as used in this Rule is a term of art, and
means a party whose interest in the case is adverse to that of another party, even though they
may be both nominally aligned as co-parties."
4 A Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 32-16 and
32-17.

As pointed out by this authority, the fact that
parties are named opposite each other in the pleadings
does not necessarily mean that they are adverse parties
as to all of the issues raised in the suit. It is well estab10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lished that parties may be adverse on some issues but not
on others. In Skornia v. Highway Pavers, Inc., 34 Wis.
2d 160, 148 N.W.2d 678, 681 (1967), the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted an adverse party statute as
follows:
"The test of who is an adverse party within the
meaning of sec. 885.14(1), Stats., is not determined by whether the person is designated a
plaintiff or a defendant in the pleadings or
whether he is adverse or not on other issues. In
the early case of O'Bay v. Meyers (1911), 147
Wis. 549, 133 N.W. 605, in discussing the problem
of adverse party under sec. 4068, Stats., we stated
the true test was 'Are their interests adverse!'
citing Crowns v. Forest Land Co. (1898), 99 Wis.
103, 74 N.W. 546. Parties to suit may be adverse
on one issue and not adverse on another, and thus
the right to call a party as an adverse witness
depends upon whether the interests of the witness
and the party seeking to call him for examination
are adverse on the subject matter of the examination."
In Bauman v. Woodfield, 244 Md. 207, 223 A.2d
364, 370, (1967)? the Maryland Supreme Court stated:
• " Rule 413a2 states, in essence, that at the trial
or upon the hearing of a motion, any part or all
of a deposition of a party, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence, may be used by an
adverse party for any purpose. 'Adverse party'
as used in this rule means a party to an action
on the opposite side of an issue raised by the
pleadings." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the term "adverse party" in connection with a dead man's statute in
Maxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 280,172 P.2d 122 (1946).
11
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I n its opinion the Court pointed out that in order to
determine who is an adverse party, it is necessary to
look past the caption on the pleadings and determine
what the parties' interests actually are in connection
with the issue in question.
SJcok v. Glendale, 3 Ariz. App. 254, 413 P.2d 585
(1966) involved a similar issue: whether the deposition
testimony could be used by one party against another
when the deponent, also a party, was not "adverse" to the
first on the issue in question. The Court there said:
"We are called upon to determine whether
a deposition taken of an adverse party prior to
trial is admissible under Eule 26 (d)(2), Eules
of Civil Procedure, 16 A.E.S., where, prior to
trial, the said adverse party by reason of an
adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy no
longer has a financial interest or possible liability in the lawsuit.
* * * "In attempting to show the authority
of William Barclay to act for and on behalf of
the co-tenants in negotiating and signing the contract in question with the City of Glendale, the
plaintiff, City of Grlendale, relied primarily upon
the deposition of William Barclay concerning the
existence of a letter which allegedly authorized
the said William Barclay to enter into and sign
said contract for and on behalf of the co-tenants."
At trial, the plaintiff cited a statute identical to
Eule 32 of the Utah Eules of Civil Procedure and used
the following argument to convince the trial court to
allow its use of the co-defendant's deposition.

12
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"The plaintiff, City of Grlendale, in offering
the deposition in evidence recited Rule 26(d)(2),
and stated as follows:
"So I think, of course, Mr. William Barclay
was a party and we are entitled to use this
deposition. We are an adverse party. He is a
defendant and as the plaintiff we are entitled
to use this deposition for any purpose. Of
course, the purpose in using this is not only
against Mr. Barclay but also against all the
defendants."
Reversing the trial court's decision, the appellate
court said:
"In order for AVilliam Barclay's deposition
to be admissible 'for any purpose,' under this
rule (26(d) (2)), Barclay must not only be a party
in the action, but the 'party' introducing the deposition must be adverse to Barclay's position in the
suit; Young v. Liddington, 50 Wash. 2d 78, 309
P.2d 761 (1967). At the time the deposition was
offered in evidence, Barclay was neither interested nor adverse to the position of the plaintiff:
*

*

#

4

'We are aware that the deposition discovery rules should be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. O'Donmell v. Breiminger, D.C.,
9 F.R.D. 245 (1949). But the right to take a
deposition does not give the party the right to
introduce the deposition in evidence without following the rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence.
This is all the more true when, by use of depositions, the right of cross-examination may be
restricted and the hearsay rule emasculated.
" i This is a deposition offered by an ' adverse
p a r t y ' in pursuant of Rule 26(d) (2) but as to the
appellee, the deponent Brand is an ordinary wit13
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ness. The statements excluded are thus in no
sense admissions against interest of a party/ "
Finn v. J. H. Rose Truck Lines, 1 Ariz. App. 27
at 33,398 P.2d 935 at 941 (1965)
The Court thus ruled:
"Further, it is generally agreed that, under
the facts in this case, while a deposition may be
admitted against an adverse party, it may not be
used against co-parties."
The foregoing authorities make it clear that the
admission of Mr. Kempton's deposition as evidence
against Grivan Ford was improper, as the plaintiff and
Mr. Kempton were not adverse parties on the question
for which the deposition was used, scope of employment.
The admission of portions of Mr. Kempton's deposition as evidence against Grivan Ford under Rule 32 was
improper for yet another reason. Use of depositions
under Rule 32(a) is qualified by the phrase, "so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence."
It is well established that a deposition is an admission of the party giving it and that the admissions of a
defendant are not admissible as evidence against a codefendant. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed) sec. 1416 p.
194 and 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) sec. 1076, p. 116.
4 Wigmore, supra, states:
"It follows that the statements of one who is
confessedly a distinct jDerson B do not become
receivable as admissions against A merely because B is also a party. In other words, the ad14
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missions of one co-plaintiff or co-defendant are
not receivable against another, merely by virtue
"\° his position as a co-party in the litigation."
See also People v. One 1950 Mercury Sedan; 116 C.A.
2d 746, 254 P.2d 66, (1953), Hyatt v. Johnson, 204 Or.
469, 284 P.2d 358 (1.955).
The following case involved the interpretation of a
statute similar to Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure: In Ghezzi v. Holly, 22 Mich. App. 157, 177
N.W.2d 247 (1970), the plaintiff named several doctors
as defendants in a malpractice suit. Relying on a statute
similar to Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court allowed the deposition of one co-defendant
to be used against another co-defendant:
"The trial court ruled that plaintiff's counsel could use Mulder's deposition for any purpose,
including its use as substantive proof as against
defendant Holly."
In reversing the trial court's decision. - • \ i • s I; * • 11 ma n
Court stated:
"Plaintiff also contends that the Mulder deposition was admissible in evidence against Hollv
by virtue of sub-section (2) of GCR 1963, 302.4.
That sub-section provides:
"The deposition of a party * * * may be used
by an adverse party for any purpose."
"Plaintiff constructs the following argument.
Mulder was a party to this litigation; plaintiff
was an adverse party. Therefore, Mulder's statement concerning causation was admissible for any

15
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purpose, i.e., as substantive evidence. Furthermore, Rule 302.4 provides that any part of a deposition may be used against any party who was
present at the taking of the deposition. Plaintiff
concludes that, since defendant Holly was present
when Mulder was deposed, Mulder's statement
can be used against Holly as substantive evidence.
We disagree."
In its opinion the Court pointed out that the rule
allows only the depositions of adverse parties to be admitted for "any purpose." It then went on to explain
why special status is granted to such depositions:
In Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Company v. Payne (1967), 6 Mich. App. 204, 207, 148
N.W.2d 503, this Court explained the use of deposition testimony under sub-section (2) of Rule
302.4 as follows:
"The difference in the practices allowed in
paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Rule is based
on the distinction between the status of the
deponent as a party capable of making admissions affecting his cause, or the party
simply as a witness. Wigmore distinguishes
the status of the deponent as well (5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed), Section 1416, p.
194):
"The general rule that the witness must be
shown unavailable for testifying in court
does not apply to a party's use of his party
opponent's deposition * * * for the simple
reason that every statement of an opponent
may be used against him as an admission
without calling him, The opponent's sworn
statement though called a deposition, is no
less an admission than any other statement
of his." (Emphasis supplied.)
16
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Sub-section (2), thus construed, is merely a restatement of the long recognized rule of evidence
that statements of a party which are inconsistent
with his claim in litigation are substantively admissible against that same party. Accord, Community Counseling Service, Inc. v. Reilly, (4 Cir.
1963), 317 F.2d 239, 243. See also, 4 Wigmore,
Evidence (3d ed), Section 1048, p. 2; 4 Moore,
Federal Practice (2d ed.), Section 26.29, p. 1963.
"However, it is an equally well established rule
of evidence that the admissions of one defendant
are not admissible in evidence against a cofendant.

"By definition, Mulder's statement at deposition
constituted an admission. That admission, however, could only be used against Mulder. It could
not be employed against defendant Holly. And
although Mulder was a party at the time the
deposition was offered in evidence, his statement
regarding causation was not, thereby, admissible
against Holly."
The rule, therefore, was not intended to allow new
areas of discovery evidence to be superimposed into the
trial record, but was merely a codification of the long
established rule of evidence that admissions of an adverse
party may be used as substantive evidence against him.
It was never intended that the rule be used to allow the
self serving statements of one co-defendant to be used
to establish the liability of another co-defendant.
In light of the reasons behind the rule, it seems
only logical that where deposition statements will have
no adverse effect on the party making them, they are not
17
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admissions and are inadmissible. Wigmore, supra, continues:
"But this allowance of the use of a party's
deposition as an admission presupposes that it is
the vpnrty-oppanent's; the deposition party's statements offered in his own favor are, of course, not
admissions. . ."
In Ghezzi v. Holly, supra, the Miehigan Court, relying on a provision similar to sub-section (a) of Kule 32
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stated:
"An express provision of Rule 302.4 supports
our conclusion. That provision is as follows:
"At the trial * * * any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition. * * V (Emphasis supplied.)
"Notwithstanding Holly's presence at the taking
of Mulder's deposition, Mulder's response at deposition to plaintiff's hypothetical question could
not be used against Holly at trial for the reason
that, as to Holly, his response was inadmissible
under the rules of evidence.
"Two additional reasons lead us to conclude that
subsection (2) provides no basis for the use of
Mulder's deposition testimony concerning causation against defendant Holly. The first is the very
rationale which forbids use of the admissions of
one party against a co-party.
"(O)rdinary fairness would forbid such a
license; for it would in practice permit a litigant
to discredit an opponent's claim merely by joining
any person as the opponent's co-party and then
employing that person's statements as admissions. It is plain, therefore, both on principle
18
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and In policy, that the statements of a co-party
(while usable of course against himself) are not
usable as admissions against co-party."
"Likewise, were we to accept the construction
of subsection (2) urged by. plaintiff, we would
enable a party-plaintiff to discredit his opponent's claims merely by joining as co-defendant any
person from whom plaintiff could obtain at deposition statements contrary to the position of
. the original defendant.
In Glen Falls Insurance Co. v. Weiss, 150 N.Y.S. 2d
685, 688 (1956), the New York Supreme Court stated:
"For the depositions thus given could not be
used by the plaintiff as against any of the other
defendants. They could be used only as proof
of the plaintiff's case in chief as against the
specific adverse party examined, or as an admission against interest against that party, or in
cross-examination of the party examined in the
event he appeared as a witness upon the trial.
A party examined before trial does not (where
there are other parties defendant) become a
general witness on all of the facts."
From the foregoing authorities, it is evident that the
trial court's admission of the deposition testimony of
Craig Kempton as evidence against Givan Ford was
erroneous. Without such evidence there is nothing upon
which the liability of appellant can be based. It is clear,
therefore, i k u tiion* was an erroneous admission which
"probably hml a substantial influence in bringing tlle
verdict" ( R u k 4. Utah Rules of Evidence) and the trial
court's decision -II'MI'M bo reversed

w>
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NO IMPROPER ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE AND VIEWING THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
RESPONDENT, THE EVIDENCE WAS STILL INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT.

Even though on appeal the evidence is viewed in
the light most favorable to the respondent, in order for
the verdict to stand on appeal, there must be a finding
that the jury did not speculate and that its decision was
based on substantial evidence. Anderson v. Nixon, 104
Utah 262,139 P.2d 216 (1943).
The liability of Givan Ford was based solely on the
theory of respondeat superior. In order to prevail under
such a theory it is necessary that the plaintiff show that
Mr. Kempton was pursuing his employer's business or
doing an act reasonably incidental to his employment at
the time the accident occurred. Saltas v. Affleck, supra.
A careful examination of the record reveals that
there was no substantial evidence upon which the jury
could have made such a finding.
Craig Kempton and Ernest E a r l were the only
witnesses whose testimony dealt with the question of the
scope of Kempton's employment. Their testimony established the following uncontradicted facts:
Kempton was hired as a lot boy (E, 130, 215). His
main duties were to keep the cars clean and start the cars
each morning (E. 45, 215). He also was allowed to drive
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the cars across the street to change their antifreeze and
was frequently sent on errands. (R. 49, 216, 228). He did
not have the authority to take a car from the premises
on his own volition, but could only do so on the express
directions of his supervisors or pursuant to a written
work order. (R. 216, 223, 225). It was undisputed that at
the time of the accident Kempton did not have permission
to take the car, was not on an errand and was not
changing antifreeze, but was driving the car for persona]
reasons. (R. 132, 133, 135, 217, 225).
To combat this uncontradicted evidence, the plaintiff offered no direct evidence showing that Kempton
acted within the scope of his employment. Only by making some unwarranted inferences was he able to get the
issue before the jury. By bringing out that Kempton had
been told to "keep the cars running" it was inferred that
Kempton had the implied authority to drive the cars on
hiis own volition. (R. 46). However, Kempton and Earl
both testified that "keep the cars running" meant that
the cars were to be started and idled regularly and that
if they wouldn't start, a mechanic was to be notified.
(R. 106, 221). By demonstrating that Kempton was
assigned a dealer's license plate it was inferred that he
was free to take and drive cars on his own initiative.
(R. 47). It was evident, however, that the plate was to
be used when cars were taken on errands. (R. 228).
From the fact that Kempton was occasionally asked
by salesmen how a particular car ran, it was inferred
that he had the authority to test drive the cars. (R. 46).
Kempton, however, admitted that he had no duties as
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a mechanic or test driver and that his knowledge of
the cars came through his driving them on errands and
starting them each morning. (R. 46, 47, 50,107,130, 230)1
Finally, plaintiff attempted to infer that because
several salesmen had offered Kempton a finder's fee for
bringing in customers, he somehow had the authority to
test drive cars (R. 106, 107). However, Kempton and
Earl both testified that Kempton had no duties as a
salesman, that he was not under the direction of the
salesmen, that he was instructed not to take orders from
salesmen, that the finder's fee arrangement was entirely
a private agreement between Kempton and the salesmen,
and that Givan Ford was in no way involved. (R. 134,
135, 230, 233).
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury's verdict, the reviewing court
should not look at the evidence supporting the prevailing
party's case in isolation, but should view it in relation
to all of the attending circumstances and countervailing
testimony. In Continental Bank v. Stewart, 4 U.2d 228,
291 P.2d 890, 892, (1955) the Court stated:
"Defendant is correct in arguing that even
though the testimony standing alone might be
sufficient to support a finding, it must always
be appraised in the light of all the attendant
circumstances and countervailing testimony."
When the plaintiff's evidence in the present case is
appraised in light of the overwhelming countervailing
evidence, it is evident that there was not sufficient evi-
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dence to support the jury's verdict, It was so clearly
established i • y incontroverted evidence that Kempton
hia) departed from the scope of his employment that tin?
question should never have been submitted to the .jury.
The Utah case of Sottas v. Affleck, supra, is practically indistinguishable on its facts and presented this
precise evidentiary question. In llial, cast", thu di'iver of
a grocery delivery truck offered two girls a ride downi)wh. Ills manager had previously instructed him
'," lake no passengers without permission. In doing
so, he deviated from the prescribed route and negligently caused an intersection collision which resulted in the death of the plaintiff's son.
The trial court directed the jury to return a verdict
in favor of the store owner which resulted in the appeal.
"Appellant argues that the question M
whether the agent was within the scope of his
employment should be submitted to the jury.
"Here there was a departure from the course
of the employment and the employer's responsibility for the acts of his employee had ceased.
When the employee has clearly departed from
the scope of his employment there is no question
to be submitted to the jury. Cannon v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 60 Utah 346, 208 P. 519;
Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 46
Utah 502, 151 P. 53; Wright v. Interrnountain
Motorcar Co., 53 Utah 176,177 P. 237."
Not only is the verdict not supported by the evidence, but H silso rjr..;iot hi* supported by a presumption
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of agency arising from the fact that Grivan Ford owned
the automobile in question. In Saltas v. Affleck, supra,
the Supreme Court pointed out that in Utah, as contrasted with the majority of jurisdictions, there is no
presumption arising from the mere fact of vehicle
ownership. See also Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611,
230 P.2d 576 (1951), and Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115,
56P.2dl049 (1936).
The Court ruled correctly that the evidence would
not justify submission of liability upon the doctrine
of ratification. Jones v. Mutual Creamery Company,
81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256 (1932).
CONCLUSION
Because there was insufficient evidence to support
the verdict and because the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting Craig Kempton's deposition
testimony as evidence against appellant, the verdict and
judgment against appellant should be set aside and a
judgment of no cause of action should be entered as a
matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
and H. JAMES CLEGG
Attorneys for Appellant
Givan Ford,Inc.
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